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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis project was completed by Stanislav Abramov and supervised 
by the Head of the Automation Degree Programme Antti Aimo. After re-
ceiving knowledge and experience in offshore operations the author de-
cided to combine this with the knowledge acquired at the university and 
the idea for this thesis was born. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to find the optimal solution for an underwa-
ter deployment of vehicles in vessels through a hull gateway. Correct 
maintenance practices and recommendations were studied for this project 
for it to become more practical. RCM objectives were implemented for a 
better appliance in the demanding field of offshore operations.  
 
The first encountered source among offshore installation guidelines was 
International Marine Contractors Association that provides theoretical data 
and is a globally approved organization setting operational standards in 
maritime operations. Other sources used here revolved around mainte-
nance and hydraulics. 
 
The final result of this research project was a creation of equipment that 
made deployment environment safer and usable in weather conditions of 
increased caution. 
 
For further development a few ideas were conceived including the possi-
bility of implementing building automation to the compartment and creat-
ing a prototype of the developed system as it was designed virtually. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the author of this thesis project took ROV Pilot Technician Grade 
II courses. This independent coursework included learning about modern 
subsea robotic interventions, safety and maintenance procedures. 
The main goal of this piece of academic work was to synergise the skills 
gathered from the ROV piloting coursework with the knowledge gathered 
from HAMK University of Applied Sciences.  
 
The topic choice was taken after a careful consideration about the skills of 
the author and the possibilities of their implementation. The main inspira-
tion and motive force for the research project was a vision that students of 
different engineering fields could invest their skills and knowledge into 
other fields of study to give each other a fresh new look on issues that are 
routine for the people that are working on them daily. 
 
This research project was divided into two parts. The first one included the 
creation of the system and the second one was the implementation of 
RCM methods to the designed equipment.  
 
As mentioned above the author wanted to invest his skills and create a sys-
tem for offshore operations and if possible to use this like a service that 
would implement it to vessels or other offshore installations. To achieve 
this prospects of the system were analysed and a cost assessment was 
done. 
 
The design process included a familiarization with marine hydraulics and 
drawing a compartment where all the equipment was situated. In this re-
search project one can find operating process of hydraulics with the de-
scription and a related flow diagram. 
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2 REVIEW ON EXISTING METHODS 
Offshore operations require high standards of safety, and in the case of 
underwater deployment for different underwater intervention instances, a 
safe environment should be provided. Since research revolves around 
ROV systems and their installation for frequent and most profitable usage, 
I will refer to the guidelines given by International Marine Contractors 
Association (IMCA) not only to pursue the goal of having high standards 
for the system but also to make this research project applicable to different 
countries without changes since this association is international. 
 
According to IMCA (2013) there are two methods for deploying ROV to 
an operational area: Over the Side Deployment and Moon pool/Cursor 
Deployment. 
 
2.1 Over the Side Deployment 
The over the side deployment method is considered to be the most cost-
effective one and most frequently used. It gives us a possibility to control 
a vehicle and its telemetry from the board or a closed compartment with a 
door system and is normally an A-frame lift which descends payload to 
the water surface as can be seen in Figure 1. Using a telescopic frame for 
the same reasons is also an option but it is not as widely used as an A-
frame, which became a common option for diving support vessels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1   A-frame with payload ready to be deployed (Abramov 2015) 
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2.2 Moonpool/Cursor Deployment 
A moonpool is an opening in the ship or offshore installation hull which 
provides access from below to different underwater operations. 
 
With this method the ROV is guided through the splash zone by the means 
of wires or rails with the conjunction of a cursor. Stability of this tech-
nique is better in comparison to over the side deployment, as the ROV is 
driven through the splash zone and risks of damaging the vehicle are re-
duced to a minimum. Usually this method is used in offshore installations 
such as oil rigs, drilling ships and some of the diving support vessels.  
 
In some cases the moonpool is a troublesome asset to the ship. When the 
ship is traveling in water can create a negative flux of particles in the hull 
opening and depending on ship structure it can affect the traveling speed. 
Hammargren and Törnblom in their thesis project (2012) mention that 
drillships cannot be implemented with sealing the hatch for their 
moonpool to prevent negative flux because they are chartered at high daily 
rates and a failure to open the hatch could lead to huge financial losses. 
Moving structure solutions are also mentioned in the research but their 
implementation would bring additional costs with their temporary nature 
(Hammargren, Törnblom 2012).  
 
 
2.3 Choice of method  
One of the research goals was to centralise ROV operations at one place 
and to reduce the influence of external interferences. The main working 
interference offshore is the weather. A closed hall or hangar for deploy-
ment is more beneficial if we have to consider the weather. A sudden 
weather change with a gush of water crushing at the vessel is not going to 
be very influential compared to an open environment when the crew is 
aboard during operations. In the case of an open environment you have to 
narrow your schedule to the point of working only when waters are calm 
and that affects the overall operational availability.  
 
For vessels that are frequently changing their positions and which during 
one month involved in several drilling support operations, it is good to 
have a compartment initially set up as an operations centre for subsea in-
terventions. When all the people involved in underwater work are working 
at the same place, nobody can interfere with the other crew members re-
sponsible for the vessel handling.  
 
Considering provided requirements the moonpool method was chosen in 
this project. Diving support vessels (DSV), are main underwater interven-
tion vessels, most of them have moonpools in closed compartments. Their 
usage varies from commercial diving to installation of subsea structures of 
different kind. When undergoing those procedures, whole crew is working 
towards the success of those works. Using closed room of DSV is a good 
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way to centralise works so that other crewmembers who are not involved 
in operations are not interfering. 
 
The system that is developed in the following chapters of this thesis, is ex-
pected to be located in the closed compartment, where normally class I or 
II ROV’s are used.  This kind of a compartment does not use a lot of 
space, it would provide a means for isolation of the equipment and sim-
plicity of usage. Maintenance recommendations are given for the chosen 
method as it can be improved with auxiliary equipment which the workers 
had not encountered previously. 
 
2.3.1 Prospects of designed system 
 
Prospects of this designed system are blurry, because it has not yet been 
built. Compartments vary and require adaptation, but as in all of technical 
research, it gives a foundation for future development even if it failed real 
implementation. The concept of a ROV handling room or launch room is 
not entirely new: people use garages daily and cars undergo maintenance 
exactly there or in the service centres. Adapting garage launch concept to 
subsea operations would make it easy to be explained to the new person-
nel. People undergoing training in this area would feel acquainted towards 
the place, thus training them to keep discipline and order would be easier. 
 
Economic prospects are based on the fact that a launch room would be al-
ways ready for vehicle deployment at high chartering rates. A prototype is 
expected to be based on hydraulics because of its possibility to apply high 
forces with components of relatively small size. Hydraulics are commonly 
used in marine technology and them is easy to introduce to an employee 
who is going to be working with them. Consequently, a system that will be 
isolating moonpool would be easy to handle. If the weather is calm and the 
water is still workers can choose not to isolate the deployment area, which 
would increase the lifetime of the installation. When the ship goes through 
maintenance procedures, it would be easier to implement equipment 
preservation solutions. Maintenance recommendation advice was one part 
of the thesis research, therefore costs for the equipment care could be es-
timated much easier than spending resources on fault finding and stress 
testing. The demand for offshore vessels, especially diving support ves-
sels, is frequently changing. At any time of the year different issues can 
occur and chartering companies or other organizations involved in subsea 
operations have to keep up with the ongoing situation. If one could pro-
vide a standby system to this demanding world of subsea technology, eco-
nomical benefits for these companies that are using it would be tangible.  
 
The isolation of the deployment area is frequently mentioned in this thesis 
but its economic value should also be explained. Covering people from in-
fluences of weather or unpredictable water gush is main target for the 
equipment. Providing this isolation surface helps keep compartment dry 
and if some water sensitive equipment is around because of human factor, 
probability of damage is greatly decreased. 
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3 IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation basis of this project was a virtual design. I would like 
to create a ROV handling room and propose solutions for different issues 
that could arise in this environment. 
 
Table 1   Companies and their deployment methods. (Abramov 2015) 
Company Vessel Specifications 
Technip Skandi Arctic Dive moonpool 2 off 4.2m x 3.6 m 
Technip Skandi Achiever Moonpool 4.2 m x 4.2 m with aera-
tion 
Technip Olympic Chal-
lenger 
ROV Moonpool 4.8m x 4.8 m  
Fugro Fugro Symphony Deployment Locations In enclosed 
Hangar Area, via hydraulic doors : 1 
x Port side, 1 x Starboard side 
Fugro Fugro Pioneer Rectangular moonpool 1630*883mm  
Fugro Fugro Saltire Moonpool 7.2m x 7.2m 
Deployment Locations 1 x Port side, 
1 x Starboard side, via hydraulic 
doors each side of enclosed central 
ROV Hangar Area 
Boskalis Constructor 1 diving moonpool 4m x 4m 
Boskalis EDT Protea 4.2 m x 4.8 m  aft of hangar 
 
According to data, presented in Table one it is clear that most of 
moonpools are a minimum of four by four meters. Based on this table I 
chose the same length with an addition of 200 millimetres for further cus-
tomisation, and 4200 mm to each side is also used as a standard moonpool 
dimension. Figure 2 shows schematically the area reserved for the 
moonpool in the drawn compartment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2   Moonpool illustration 4200mm x 4200mm (Abramov 2015) 
Underwater deployment using a hull gateway 
 
 
6 
3.1 System components 
 
3.1.1 Tether management 
After having chosen the dimensions for the moonpool further planning of 
auxiliary equipment could be made. In this particular case, when ROV 
would enter water below the ship, the first piece of equipment moving be-
hind the vehicle is its telemetry.  
 
A tether or umbilical is a mean for establishing linkage with a vehicle, and 
normally a twisted pair or fibre cables are used. Tether management sys-
tem (TMS), Launch and recovery systems (LARS) are the solutions for a 
tether deployment. Both solutions imply that target payload is safely driv-
en to the operational area with a desired length of tether following it. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates Luffing A-frame LARS with auxiliary systems. With the 
assistance of an ROV manual (Christ, Wernli 2014), the author defined the 
equipment that should be taken into account when designing the deploy-
ment system: 
 Hydraulic power unit (HPU) 
 Winch  
 TMS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to knowledge mentioned above, the system that was developed 
by the author included enough space for all of the equipment. Physical ob-
stacles and ease of use also had to be taken into account. 
At this point it was possible to draw the interior of the deployment room 
and based on that continue research with further improvements. Figure 
four explains the positions for the equipment chosen for the system. 
 
Figure 3   LARS example provided in ROV Manual, Courtesy Schilling Robotics (Christ, Wernli 
2014) 
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3.1.2 Lifting equipment 
Area “A” in the Figure 4 illustrates space above the moonpool. The de-
ployment of an ROV through this area, should be made by lifting systems. 
During ROV pilot technician courses the author noticed that if a moonpool 
was used, the safest way to guide the equipment through was to use frames 
that would keep the system stable until the payload reached a desired 
depth. With the help of round shaped snubbers and TMS tightly attached 
to the vehicle, it is possible to achieve a safe deployment through the hull 
area. However, if weather conditions affect stability, ship roll can cause 
damage. The installation could swing like a pendulum and hit the equip-
ment by the vessel walls. To reduce the possibility of this kind of damage 
the installation could be strengthened by metallic frames. 
 
Since this research project aimed at developing compartment for frequent 
use in different weather conditions, preference was given to the most reli-
able option. Stabilizing cursor with rails is widely used to negate the ef-
fects of weather conditions and for a safe handling of ROV through the 
moonpool. Isolated deployment area with a sliding cursor mechanism in-
side was the chosen option here. Isolating A-frame mechanism would 
have been more troublesome since it travels some distance from the initial 
position to the position above deployment area adding more installation 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4   Example of possible equipment positioning, A – space for TMS and means of 
isolation, B – winch systems for cable handling or heave compensation, C – Hydraulic 
power unit (Abramov 2015) 
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3.1.3 Hydraulic Power Unit 
 
The hydraulic power unit is an essential asset to the installation where lift-
ing of equipment takes place. In the developed system, it was wise to have 
hydraulics for lifting because hydraulics have a proven record of reliabil-
ity. If failure of the system happened, hand control could be used with 
steering solutions or lever action like a car jack. 
 
Figure four illustrates the position and schematic representation of the 
HPU unit. The close location to the operational area was chosen because it 
was essential to monitor the readings and have visual observation for 
working hydraulic machines. Readings can indicate troubles in systems 
and if was needed some maintenance, it could be brought to a stop. In 
IMCA guidelines for installing ROV systems it is mentioned that exhausts 
and vents should be positioned so that they remain clear and not located 
where they could pose a risk to personnel (IMCA R 018, 6). This require-
ment is fulfilled simply by locating hydraulics into different areas of the 
ship or using specific means of ventilation but in the case of our setup, it 
was left in the proposed place for demonstrational purposes.   
 
 
3.1.4 HPU operating process 
 
When the HPU begins functioning, hydraulic liquid is moved out of the 
tank into the accumulator by the gear pump. Process is continued until 
pressure in the accumulator reaches predefined level, at this point begins 
circulation of fluid, to achieve that charging valve is switching pumping 
action into circulation. This causes the pump to discharge liquid through 
charging valve once again into the tank at minimal pressure. One-way 
valve prevents fluid from flowing out of the accumulator. Charging valve 
activates once again if the pressure drops. (Thomasnet 2015) 
 
3.2 Details of drawn system 
It was mentioned before that moonpool was 4200 by 4200 millimetres 
wide. 
The system was designed according to provided dimensions. The project 
provided safe and relatively dry handling of the system. To achieve that, 
the system was divided into two states “Operational” and “Preparatory”. 
The operational state means that the system undergoes deployment opera-
tions or the vehicle is in use and the Preparatory state is for maintenance 
and ROV system preparations. By preparation, it is meant that the ROV 
personnel is undergoing checklist routines, maintenance or having toolbox 
talk and the system is not yet operated. Further development is provided to 
the two state division in the next chapters. 
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3.2.1 Hydraulics 
 
The two state divided system was planned to be piston like. Marine indus-
try is rich in various hydraulic systems that have proven record of reliabil-
ity. With the help of “The Hydraulic Trainer” (Volume three) which is a 
training manual for planning and design of hydraulic power systems, op-
erating pressure of up to 300 bars was estimated and a diagram was drawn 
according to the data presented in the manual (Drexler, Faatz, Feicht, Geis 
& Morlok 1988, 21). The system is handled by a hydraulic piston of com-
patible size. In Figure 5 it is presented how the hydraulic part of the sys-
tem would look like with its flow diagram drawn in Festo Didactic Flu-
idSIM software.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5   Hydraulic design with flow diagram. Yellow square tube demonstrates hy-
draulic piping. Blue colour stands chosen for hydraulics and related auxiliary compo-
nents. (Abramov 2015) 
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3.2.2 Covering structure. 
 
In this chapter, the mechanical moving parts and frames are examined. 
Amongst mechanical installations, there were parts in the ROV system 
that took some space and should be delivered along with it. Amongst that 
equipment there was a heave compensation unit that provided safety for 
deployed tools. Therefore, if ROV of any class is delivered, we have to 
take into account that actual size of system may vary. For example, Saab 
Seaeye Company produces vehicles called Tiger with specific sizes of 
TMS. As the author had simulator experience with this vehicle, it was 
used here as the vehicle of choice for examination and modelling. 
 
 
Table 2   Saab Seaeye TMS type 2 specifications and dimensions (Saab 
Seaeye, 2015) 
TMS 2 Specifications:  
 
ROV model Seaeye Tiger 
Construction Galvanized steel 
Bailing System Polypropylene construction with hard-
anodized aluminium central boss. Se-
aeye SM4 motor drive with hard rubber 
universal coupling to bale arm gearbox. 
Electronics Pod Hard-anodised aluminium cylinder. 
Seaeye metal shell connectors. 
Tether capacity 140m of 17mm tether 
 
TMS 2 Dimensions:  
 
Length 1200 mm 
Width 1200 mm 
Height to lift eye 1640 mm 
Total Weight in air Approx. 460 kg 
Depth Rating 1000 metres 
 
Data given in Table 2 provides the dimensions for the estimating area that 
was to be isolated.  Width should be no less than 1200 mm with an addi-
tion of at least 500 mm for the crew to reach equipment between bars that 
guide the moving structure. The length is approximated around 3000mm, 
1200mm - the length of the TMS cage with an addition of 1640 mm clear-
ance for lifting purposes. Figure 6 demonstrates the drawing, made ac-
cording to required lengths with respect to 4200 by 4200 mm moonpool. 
The structure itself was a square-shaped metallic box reinforced by frames 
on the edges. To simplify the description author proposed calling it a me-
tallic carcass padded with metallic sheets. 
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3.2.3 Isolation 
 
 
Isolation of the deployment system is made by making top-down moving 
structure. Structure is moving from above to cover deployment area with 
equipment prepared to launch. Box-like structure is moved by hydraulic 
piston and is isolated by means of applying pressure to the rubber installed 
into input notches. Figure 7 visually explains moving direction of covering 
structure and demonstrates position of input notches.   
 
 
 
Figure 6   Area marked with X is reserved for TMS installation and its dimensions. 
(Abramov 2015) 
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As mentioned above in the method choice and prospects section, this piece 
of equipment is crucial part of the research as its functionality provides 
system availability in harsh weather environment. Choice of material that 
is going to be used in isolation structure is slightly abstract since different 
clients could have dissimilar to each other requirements of quality. But it 
is still clear that main parts that are in contact with water, are in danger of 
corrosion, they require certain protection. If elasticity of the covering 
structure does not matter to the client, then rubber materials could be used. 
From authors perspective highest quality is achieved through using mate-
rials that are, conceivably, steel alloys which have been treated with gal-
vanic protection. Input notches could be metallic but then it is wise to add 
rubber pads to the parts that are in physical contact frequently to negate 
damage from pressure applied. As could be seen on Figure 7, author pro-
posed rubber isolation pad fixed between input notches. Shape of the input 
notches would fix rubber pad in position when pressure would be applied 
from above. 
 
 
Figure 7   Movement direction of covering structure (arrows), Input notches (Light Green), Rubber isola-
tion pad (Dark Green). (Abramov 2015) 
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3.2.4 Final compartment drawing 
 
Previous chapters have defined necessary equipment that is needed to be 
in the ROV deployment compartment and it became possible to draw it 
with correct positioning of the equipment. Figure 8 demonstrates final 
sketch drawing of the compartment with developed isolation cover system. 
It is suggested by the author that ROV operations would be centralised in 
one place, so that other vessel crew would not be interfered. As an addi-
tion it is possible to use developed compartment as the control room. Be-
cause of the water isolation provided, client can install more environmen-
tal sensitive equipment. If there is enough space, empty area could be used 
as a ROV maintenance or repair workshop, where personnel would pre-
pare equipment for subsea intervention and as mentioned above, they 
would not bother other crew members of the vessel. 
 
 
In sketch drawing of the system it is seen that main pieces of the equip-
ment are placed in a way that operating one would not interfere with oper-
ation of another. Winch has cyan cable coming to the system of pulleys 
that are guiding cable to the top-down covering structure. This is schemat-
ic demonstration of heave compensation system that could be placed in vi-
cinity of the moonpool area. Covering structure is moving up or down 
with the stroke of the hydraulic piston, its direction is both guided and re-
inforced with the support beams on the edge of each side of square struc-
ture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8   Final drawing of the compartment (Abramov 2015) 
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4 MAINTENANCE 
 
4.1 RCM 
From engineering point of view, management of any physical asset is di-
vided in two elements. It must be maintained and may need modification 
from time to time. Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) is focused on 
determination of what must be done in order to ensure that physical asset 
continues to do what its user want it to do in its present operating context. 
(Moubray, J 1997 6-7) 
 
4.1.1  Seven basic RCM questions 
To ensure sustainability and long-term operability of equipment, I have 
decided to use RCM method. RCM process is made from answering to 
seven basic questions. 
 
 What are the functions and associated performance standards of the asset 
in its present operating context? 
 
Virtual nature of examined system cripples possibility to get firsthand ex-
perience from users of the asset, which could be very valuable infor-
mation.  Despite virtual nature, it is still possible to describe functions and 
define performance standards. Intentional simplicity of the system implies 
that it is limited to two states and only function is to transit from one state 
to another.  Other possible function is isolation of system during unfavor-
able weather conditions.  
 
In what way does it fail to fulfil its functions? 
 
 
Table 3   Failure functions. (Abramov 2015) 
Function Functional failure 
To move piston up or down. Not enough pressure from HPU. 
 
Directional valve not switching liq-
uid flow direction. 
 
Piston components worn out. 
 
Pressure liquid leakage. 
System isolation. Physical obstruction. 
 
Sealing components worn out. 
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Structural integrity impaired. 
 
Input notches damage. 
 
 
What causes each functional failure? 
 
Table 4   Functional failures and causes. (Abramov S.2015) 
 
Functional Failure (modes) Cause  
Piston movement  
Not Enough pressure from HPU. One of the HPU components failed. 
Directional valve not switching 
liquid flow direction. 
Component break or control system 
failure. 
Piston components worn out. Fracture or wear of moving compo-
nents. 
Isolation structure  
Physical obstruction. Some object gets in the way of 
moving parts. 
Sealing components worn out. Rubber seal worn out and small 
cracks leak water. 
Structural integrity impaired. Bend of the structure due to con-
stant pressure applied. 
Input notches compromised. Physical damage of notches made 
them incapable to insert related 
structure. 
 
What happens when each failure occurs? 
 
The case system is based on hydraulics and its operability; therefore, it has 
direct relation with HPU availability. Even though HPU could consist 
from many different components, main ones are in an almost every hy-
draulic power unit. Failure of any of the HPU components can lead to ina-
bility of system operation. Considering the severity of possible failures in-
side auxiliary hydraulic units, their failure effects are examined along with 
mentioned failure causes in Table 5 down below. 
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Table 5   Failure Effects. (Abramov S.2015) 
 
Failure Failure mode 
 Piston movement (And HPU Components failure) 
Accumulator 
failure 
Failure of the accumulator can be traced by overall 
pressure loss in hydraulic system and fluid leakage. 
The pool of liquid could be noticed near the faulty 
system. This could lead to a formation of a slippery 
surface that can potentially harm personnel. Pressure 
loss results in a slow operation of the system and in-
adequate control response. Accumulators have certain 
degree of isolation with precisely calculated character-
istics. To avoid defection of set characteristics it is 
wise to replace faulty piece of equipment with the new 
one. 
Motor Pump 
failure 
Pumps serve as a motive force that is driving liquid to 
the accumulators or through valves. Failure of this 
component can be noticed by emitting of unusual 
noise, increase of noise loudness, heating of related 
components or hydraulic liquid, cavitation, slow oper-
ation. To prevent most of those issues it is recom-
mended to schedule preventive maintenance according 
to documentation provided by supplier. 
Tank failure Being a storage unit for the liquid, tank can build up 
unwanted sludge if some liquid other than operating 
liquid would enter hydraulic system. Leakage of tank 
can lead to a slippery surfaces near equipment that can 
damage personnel and overall system pressure loss. 
Tanks are not always pressurized and it is possible to 
repair them on cite without component replacement. 
Filter failure Failure of filter unit can lead to the change in operat-
ing liquid properties or build up unwanted sludge. 
Theoretically, it is possible to operate system without 
or with faulty filter unit and because most of them are 
self-contained, they can often be replaced even when 
HPU is being operated. 
Power Unit 
Controllers fail-
ure 
Broken control interface causes inability to operate 
hydraulic system. It could be noticed instantly as the 
system will not respond to operation commands. 
Causes vary from software bugs and crashes to related 
mechanisms damage. Main hazard of this event is 
jamming of the system. Nature of the failure could be 
based on software issues and normally it is the case 
for the information technology specialist. Other failure 
cases could be found with electrical testing equipment 
as modern control systems are based on electrical sig-
nal handling. 
Directional valve 
is not switching 
liquid flow direc-
tion 
Most descriptive evidence that event of failure has 
occurred would be movement of piston to only one 
direction. Leakage of fluid if that is the case, could be 
seen nearby the directional valve. To repair this part of 
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equipment, operating liquid should be drained to the 
storage tank and broken component should be re-
placed. 
Piston compo-
nents worn out. 
Unusual noises while the system is in motion, could 
indicate that components are in danger of breaking. If 
piston is broken whole lifting system would become 
unavailable. To repair this system operating liquid 
should be drained to storage tank and then compo-
nents could be replaced. Liquid leakage could be no-
ticed by observing unusual amounts of liquid around 
the moving parts that are obviously exceeding allowa-
ble amounts. 
 Isolation structure 
Physical obstruc-
tion. 
System is not isolated and that could be noticed visu-
ally, some object is in the way. To fix this issue, sys-
tem should be lifted up and obstructing object re-
moved from traveling path. If the system is bent it still 
could potentially isolate environment, only severe 
bending and damage to structural integrity can lead to 
failure in isolation. Some minor bending could be 
fixed by straightening with rubber hammer for in-
stance. Severe damages should be fixed by component 
change. 
Sealing compo-
nents worn out. 
Sealing components below sealing structure leak wa-
ter that could be noticed visually. To repair worn rub-
ber components some chemical solutions are used to 
fill cracks or change of whole seal is a more reliable 
solution. 
Structural integ-
rity impaired. 
Evidence of failure is mostly visual, impaired system 
is jolting while in motion, elastic motions could be 
seen and when reaching point of isolation system may 
look shifted by a certain angle. To repair damaged 
structure technician should first try to fasten screws 
that connect metal plates with each other. Other repair 
processes are dependent on the nature of the fracture 
and it is impossible to predict repair procedures. 
Input notches. Damaged input notches lead to water leakage and 
pools of water near the equipment could be seen. Re-
placement of damaged notches is most obvious solu-
tion.  
 
In what way does each failure matter? 
 
RCM process requires detailed description about each failure conse-
quence. Knowledge about severity of each failure can assist in planning 
preventive measures and categorize them accordingly. Table 6 is drawn 
for failure consequences analysis. 
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Table 6   Failure consequences. (Abramov 2015) 
 
Failure Consequence ( I – safety and envi-
ronmental, II – operational) 
Accumulator failure I – Leakage of liquid can result in 
slippery surface and that is danger-
ous to the crew, equipment in the 
compartment is metallic and falling 
down on it could result in fatal inju-
ry. 
II – Pressure loss decreases overall 
system response to the commands. 
Not enough pressure may bring 
system to full stop. 
Motor Pump failure I – Faulty motor pump can produce 
high decibel noise that can damage 
hearing of personnel that is working 
nearby. Leakage can be harmful in 
the same way as mentioned above. 
II – Pressure loss can affect opera-
tions in the same way as mentioned 
above. Unavailability of this piece 
of equipment leads to impossibility 
of system operation. 
Tank failure I – Leakage can be harmful in the 
same way as mentioned above. 
II – If leakage is severe and there is 
no way to fix that, pressure loss can 
affect operations in the same way as 
mentioned above. Built up sludge 
can damage equipment that is oper-
ated by the hydraulic liquid. 
Filter failure I – No severe damage to the envi-
ronment or crew, but failure itself 
can lead to damage of auxiliary 
equipment that can bring harm to 
the personnel.  
II – No severe intervention to the 
system operation. Failure to repair 
filter can result in damage of other 
hydraulic components that are in-
volved in operation. 
Power Unit Controllers failure I – If crew is working nearby mov-
ing parts of the equipment and con-
trollers will fail it can result in seri-
ous injury. 
II – System will fully stop or finish 
last task it received to carry out. 
Directional valve is not switching 
liquid flow direction 
I – No severe damage to the crew if 
works nearby are carried out with 
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adequate prudence. 
II – System would be brought to the 
full stop or will move only one way 
as flow direction to the opposite 
way is compromised. 
Piston components worn out. I – Noise produced by worn off 
components can damage hearing 
ability over some time, while work-
ing in that area. Instant release of 
payload due to piston wear can lead 
to fatal injury. 
II – System would be brought to the 
full stop and become unavailable. 
Physical obstruction. I – Due to unpredictable nature of 
obstruction it can damage personnel 
working nearby with sudden re-
bound of stuck object. 
II – System would still be opera-
tional. Purpose of isolating deploy-
ment area would be compromised. 
Sealing components worn out. I – Water coming from deployment 
area can lead to slippery surface and 
that can damage the personnel 
working nearby. 
II – Depending on amount of water 
that has got through sealing area, 
ranking of the failure could be ap-
proximated. Too much water can 
influence lubricated surfaces nearby 
and lead to a corrosion of metallic 
surfaces.  
Structural integrity impaired. I – Due to pressure applied from 
above the compromised structure, 
some parts can suddenly rebound 
and damage personnel. 
II – Leakage of water is possible. 
Too much water can influence lu-
bricated surfaces nearby and lead to 
a corrosion of metallic surfaces. 
Input notches. I – Possibility of slippery surface 
nearby. Pressure of structure above 
can result in rebound of some dam-
aged notch parts resulting in inju-
ries. 
II – Leakage of water can influence 
in the same way as mentioned in 
structural integrity and sealing 
components failures above. 
 
What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? 
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According to presented data above, prevention maintenance table can be 
created for each failure. Failures with most severe consequences are the 
ones that require maintenance more often than the others. To sort failures, 
I have divided them into 3 colours to simplify understanding of their im-
portance. First category is red as this colour is most aggressive and resem-
bles high importance. Second colour was chosen yellow, it resembles neu-
tral attitude to the issue but still brings sense of caution to the observer. 
Green colour is internationally approved colour of acceptance and implies 
that something is of acceptable standard. According to colour differentia-
tion it is possible to make decision about maintaining component or un-
derstand severity of possible failure. Visual inspection is compulsory for 
all of the examined components before and after operations. 
 
Table 7   Failure prevention. (Abramov 2015) 
 
Failure  Prevention advice 
Accumulator failure Operating principle of this part of equipment relies 
on building up pressure and manipulation with 
valves.  Preventive maintenance procedures should 
be made according to manufacturer provided stand-
ards. Isolation of the system should be checked to 
avoid faulty states. Systems with pressure manipu-
lation are made with high durability and most likely 
will not fail really often.  
Motor Pump failure This component should be maintained more often 
than other components of HPU unit because failure 
of this component leads to noise pollution that 
makes deployment compartment unpleasant place 
to work in along with system inoperability. 
Maintenance procedures should include checking 
of force and torque produced by motor, flow of 
operated liquid and for the possibility of leakage. 
Tank failure Amongst maintenance procedures, required by the 
manufacturer, tank should be checked for leakage, 
especially if it is pressurized.   
Filter failure As mentioned in previous tables, filters are often 
self-contained, meaning that maintenance of their 
internal systems is predefined by manufacturer. If 
operating liquid requires more often change of filter 
it should be scheduled accordingly. 
Power Unit Control-
lers failure 
Modern control units could be made by means of 
electronic equipment and in this case software 
should be checked for bugs and possible flows. IT 
personnel should be informed right away if control 
system is influencing daily operations with soft-
ware problems. Maintenance, predefined by manu-
facturer, should be carried out with local software 
changes taken into account. If system is operated 
by means of push buttons, it should be checked 
regularly for adequate response time. 
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Directional valve is 
not switching liquid 
flow direction 
While checking, valve should switch both ways 
with the same response time. Possibility of leakage 
should be tested. Manufacturer set procedures 
should also be carried out. 
Piston components 
worn out. 
Nondestructive testing techniques revealing struc-
tural changes should be made and therefore list of 
changes from previous maintenance procedures is 
essential in this case. Visual check is also of great 
importance, since piston is self-lubricated with op-
erating liquid and observation of changes in this 
matter can reveal failure of other components. 
Physical obstruc-
tion. 
To prevent this failure, local supervisor should be 
aware about his workers safety knowledge. Person-
nel should be informed that moving parts of the 
system should not be obstructed with anything. 
Sealing components 
worn out. 
Regular visual check of components should be car-
ried out to notice cracks in rubber material. Nonde-
structive testing techniques can reveal structural 
changes in this component. 
Structural integrity 
impaired. 
To prevent impairs of structure, regular fastening of 
screws and other possible connection means should 
be done. Nondestructive testing techniques can 
reveal integrity impairs. 
Input notches. Nondestructive testing along with visual inspection 
reveals status of this component. 
 
What if a suitable proactive task cannot be found? 
 
To answer this question group of people working on maintenance deci-
sions should gather and decide what should be done. There are 2 options 
that are available: Failure-finding and redesign. Failure-finding means that 
people operating the equipment along with maintenance professionals, 
would provide information about failures and decisions would be made 
accordingly. Redesign means that equipment could not be handled effi-
ciently enough without redesigning weak parts of the system. In case of 
this thesis project it is impossible to predict what could happen so that 
proactive task would not be found. (Moubray, J 1997) 
 To give better view about failures and how to utilize them, fault tree anal-
ysis is made in next chapters. 
 
 
4.2 Fault Tree Analysis  
With this method better reliability estimates could be done. RCM gives 
detailed view about failures and FTA assists in their utilization. Basic 
Boolean logic is used in modelling and it gives possibility to build fault 
trees of different complexity. Relations between events, also known as 
blocks, are explained with different gates defined by the Boolean algebra. 
This concept was developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1962 for 
US Air Force to use it with Minuteman system. Later Boeing Company 
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has adopted it and extensively applied it as the aircraft faults where severe 
and needed precise analysis models. Fault tree is one of many different 
analytical logic techniques. It was chosen for this research as it provides 
good visual explanation about failures and gives solid basis of improve-
ment. (Weibull, 2015) Figure 9 demonstrates fault tree example. 
 
 
4.2.1 ELMAS Modelling 
ELMAS – Event logic modelling and analysis software. It is a software for 
modelling logical relations between events. An event can mean that 
change of any situation have happened. Other event related features could 
be modelled with many different methods. The created model is used to 
expand knowledge about analysed system and to document data. Software 
uses common model structure and it is possible to model any object with 
it. I will use most common application of this software – FTA. For time 
period of 10 years I will simulate possibilities of failure according to data 
provided with RCM analysis based on answering 7 basic questions. 
(Ramentor, 2015)  
 
From internet sources and personal contacts, cost of each component was 
estimated and is presented in table 8. Approximated costs demonstrate that 
system would cost around EUR 20.000 – 25.000 if it would be used as a 
service for offshore vessel operators. Capital spent on the installation of 
the system is expected to pay off when one would operate system in harsh 
environments, on the chartering rates that were not possible earlier be-
cause of the weather conditions. Costs provided are entered in the ELMAS 
software and several simulation runs have shown that if maintenance tech-
nician would do equipment change rather than repairmen it would cost for 
ten years not more than EUR 200.000, therefore client can relate those 
costs with profits of the typical operation and would decide whether to 
implement this feature to his vessel or not. 
 
 
Figure 9   Example of the fault tree. (Weibull, 2015) 
   
   
Underwater deployment using a hull gateway 
 
 
23 
 
 
Table 8   Component cost estimation. (Abramov 2015) 
Component   Cost 
Steel Bars for carcass EUR 4000  
Galvanized steel sheets 5 pieces EUR 73 (EUR 14.6 each) 
Hydraulic power unit EUR 1000  
Hydraulic piston of required size 
and stroke 
EUR 2900 
Hydraulic tank unit EUR 350 
Accumulator  EUR 180 
Directional valve EUR 80-100 
Hydraulic Piping EUR 20-100 for each component 
 
FTA from Figure 10 that is made in ELMAS software, shows how two 
main groups of the system components are influencing overall operability. 
According to the approximation guidelines, components where given 
mean time before failure and that is most important entry to approximate 
probability of failure during the given time (CITAITON) . Most compo-
nents where estimated to fail at least once in a year, but actual time to fail-
ure is calculated by the software. Red blocks represent components with 
highest probability rate of failure. Yellow and green blocks are less signif-
icant but still are of importance as they affect system availability. To sim-
plify understanding of fault tree, it is important to explain relation of 
blocks. Block number one that is event of our interest is triggered when 
one of the blocks 2 or 3 is true. Blocks 2 or 3 that represent equipment 
groups are triggered only when root failure events, at the lowest row, have 
happened.  
 
ELMAS software provides its user with simulation tool and in case of the 
FTA one can estimate quantity of failures during given period of time. As 
it was mentioned above, ten years of service is the target time period to be 
Figure 10   Fault tree of the researched system. (Abramov 2015) 
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examined. In Figure 11 simulation result window is shown and according 
to this information it is possible to explain each failure one by one. 
 
 
First thing that is noticed is that the system was unavailable around 57 
times during time period of ten years. This number of events includes 
32.855 failures that happened because structure was compromised. Hy-
draulics influenced system availability 24.201 times. As the components 
have different significance in the terms of failures each of them must be 
analysed and according to that sort most influential ones from the insignif-
icant. Table 9 demonstrates results of simulation, numeric quantity of each 
failure and its significance. According to that data it could be seen that 
amongst 56.802 times of failure, only 32.608 of those failures are of sig-
nificant value. Quantity of failures show that main components that are in 
danger of failure are hydraulic filters and mechanical parts of moving 
structure. Filters could be replaced so it is wise to have pair of those for 
replacement, moving parts on the other hand require regular non-
destructive testing and personnel operating them should report if strange 
behavior of the equipment is noticed. Presented results lead to a conclu-
sion that without preventive maintenance system would fail 3 times a year 
and that would lead to the unnecessary investments in repair. If good pre-
ventive maintenance practises would be applied it is possible to negate all 
of the presented failures. 
 
Table 9   Simulation results analysis. (Abramov 2015) 
 
Failure block № Significance/explanation 
Figure 11   Simulation results. (Abramov 2015) 
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System Unavailable 56.802 Total number of failures. 
Structure 32.855 One of two groups of equipment. 
Sealing Components 10.03 
5+5 
Yellow block in FTA. This component 
has relatively low influence on opera-
bility, therefore considered as insignifi-
cant failure but still can bring nuisance 
to the personnel as the liquid can effect 
works in the area, therefore from ten 
failures half could be significant. 
Physical Obstruction 9.865 Green block in FTA. Easily avoided if 
discipline is kept amongst personnel. 
Insignificant failure. 
Input Notch 9.759 Green block in FTA. Without this com-
ponent it is still possible to isolate sys-
tem by mean s of rubber pads even 
though they could wear much faster in 
comparison with unbroken component. 
Insignificant failure. 
Frame and Casing 3.295 Yellow block in FTA. Although this 
component can still perform its func-
tions while failed its significance comes 
from consequences that it can produce 
if it would influence other pieces of 
equipment or even the personnel. Sig-
nificant failure. 
Hydraulics 24.201 One of two groups of equipment. 
Filters 9.812 Yellow block in FTA. Although this 
component can still perform its func-
tions while failed its significance comes 
from consequences that it can produce 
if it would influence other pieces of 
equipment. Significant failure. 
Directional Valve 3.453 Red block in FTA. If this component 
would fail system becomes inoperable. 
Significant failure. 
Motor Pump 3.307 Red block in FTA. Component is im-
portant in operation, without it hydrau-
lic liquid would not be moving in a 
system as intended. Significant failure. 
Accumulator 3.242 Yellow block in FTA. Consequences 
produced by failure of this component 
provide pressure drop in the system 
making it inoperable. Significant fail-
ure. 
Piston Components 2.424 Red block in FTA. Moving part of the 
system, if failed isolation function 
could not be performed. Significant 
failure. 
Power Unit Controllers 2.075 Red block in FTA. If failed it is not 
possible to operate system. Significant 
failure. 
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4.3 Maintenance recommendations 
Recommendation of maintenance practices was chosen to be made with 
RCM documents. This choice is based on a possibility to implement high 
quality documentation of the maintenance procedures. To achieve that cli-
ent should encourage discipline in documentation. 
4.3.1 RCM decisions 
 
RCM decisions process is made by filling worksheets with data gathered 
about the equipment that is going to be examined. Two of the key docu-
ments for RCM decision making help track failures, analyse them, predict 
future ones and plan preventive measures. First document is RCM infor-
mation worksheet, second one is the RCM decision worksheet. Both of 
those documents would be applied to the developed system and style of 
the documents is inspired by the RCM tutoring teacher at HAMK Univer-
sity of applied sciences Heikki Ruohomaa and RCM teaching book called 
Reliability-centered Maintenance (Moubray, J 1997 198). Documents pro-
vided should be considered as the reference material since installed 
equipment could vary according to clients need and applying them without 
correct assessment is not recommended. 
 
 
4.3.2 RCM information worksheet  
This paper shows RCM practice called FMEA, failure modes and effects 
analysis. Document can introduce personnel to the possible failure modes 
and effects it could produce. Table like style it is visually explaining de-
tails of failures and maintenance professional, responsible for decision 
making can determine further actions after comparing written information 
with actual status of the system. Figure 12 demonstrates RCM information 
worksheet designed for this research project. According to a provided data 
it is possible to track date of worksheet creation and one can estimate how 
much time have passed and how system behavior has changed during its 
lifetime. People involved in this project are also mentioned there and if 
some question would arise it is possible to contact those people for better 
explanation of provided data. 
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4.3.3 RCM decision worksheet 
Last three of seven basic RCM questions make up the RCM process. Ac-
cording to these questions strategic framework could be made with the 
help of RCM decision diagram. Figure 13 demonstrates framework that 
could be applied to each of the failure modes that were listed in the RCM 
information worksheet. 
 
Questions provided by the decision diagram are guidelines to fill in the 
decision worksheet. With respect to those answers it is possible to record: 
 How often and what kind of a routine maintenance is to be done 
and by whom 
 Which failures are significant enough to prescribe redesign of the 
system 
 Cases where cautious decisions were made and that let failures to 
happen 
There are sixteen columns in the worksheet. First four columns cross-refer 
data from information worksheet and answer questions from RCM deci-
sion diagram. Other columns are self-explanatory. 
Figure 12  RCM information worksheet. (Abramov 2015) 
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Figure 14 demonstrates RCM decision worksheet made by answer-
ing questions from RCM decision diagram. Please note that this is 
general sheet about failure to provide main task of the system. It is 
possible to create same kind of sheets to every failure mentioned in 
the previous chapters. Essentially, the RCM worksheets show what 
course of action and why it was selected to deal with each failure. 
High importance of this information is based on the possibility to 
do any maintenance task when required at any time. Documented 
information also gives ability to trace back each task to the func-
tions, in addition maintenance planning could be up to date if each 
sheet is stored in a way that you can refer to it while planning cur-
rent maintenance procedures. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13   RCM decision diagram (Moubray, J 1997) 
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5 CONCLUSION 
During the first steps in the information gathering process for the research 
project, existing methods of underwater deployment analysed and it be-
came clear to the author that both of them were good in their own ways. 
The choice of moonpool deployment satisfied the need to implement good 
practices of equipment handling. The usage of equipment in harsh envi-
ronments was also possible because of the method chosen. 
 
The main goal was to synergise the knowledge of writing individual with 
practical experience. Result was better than expected as it was also possi-
ble to implement industrial maintenance practices. The author had a vision 
that students from different fields of engineering should not be bound by 
their specific field of study. Implementation of different engineering 
points of view should be encouraged amongst learning facilities and this 
research project was inspired by this vision. 
 
A hydraulic subsystem was developed in the project and it played a very 
important role in system operating. Being a student of industrial engineer-
ing it was a challenging task to familiarised with marine hydraulics. 
Thanks to the information provided by HAMK library, it was possible to 
get acquainted with essentials of the related field. 
 
The developed system major space of improvement. Amongst possible 
upgrades that could be produced by the students, there are ways to imple-
ment automation technology into the compartment. Building automation is 
also a subject of implementation on-site as the people working there re-
Figure 14   RCM decision worksheet. (Abramov 2015) 
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quire a pleasant environment so that they are not bothered by the nuisanc-
es of humidity, lack of lighting or cold. Building a real working prototype 
was also possible but it was impossible to implement it into this research 
project as it required a major investment of time and resources to get ac-
quainted with the material studies. This is also a field of improvement for 
this project. 
 
Maintenance and design software made this research project possible. De-
sign was made sketch-like in software called Google Sketchup to show 
visually details of the developed system. Functionality of the design soft-
ware allowed the author to use real dimensions that led to the adequate 
approximation of distances between the equipment and their sizes. 
Maintenance software used was ELMAS by Ramentor. This software al-
lowed the author to simulate failure probabilities and to understand the se-
verity of each possible failure of the system so that the client had infor-
mation to refer to in case he wanted to implement it. 
 
One of the goals was to create a system or to provide service idea to the 
offshore industry. This task was fulfilled with the creation of moonpool 
isolation equipment. It is possible to organise a service that would install 
and maintain related equipment to vessels that have moonpools. 
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